The objective of this research is to relate company performance (in terms of different measures) to corporate governance characteristics (like board size, internal or external majority governance) for the publicly listed information technology (IT) companies in Australia. A sample of 55 such companies are considered. Results reveal that, contrary to the popular belief in respect to positive influence of external board members, performance of the IT companies tend to worse with higher degree of board independence. We attribute the characteristics of these outcomes to the dynamic properties of the IT industrial sector in Australia. Linear regression models relating the performance measures to board characteristics along with other financial information have also been developed. The number of senior management members has been identified as the key board characteristic factor in these models, implying the importance of major internal control over highly independent board for the publicly listed Australian IT companies.
Introduction
The structure of a company's governing board and its effect on the company's performance is a well pursued research area (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997;  Van der Walt et al., 2006; Shijun, 2008; Bowen, 1994) . A company's business effectiveness is influenced by a number of factors including the economy in which the company primarily operates, the characteristics of the company and governing laws of the countries in context. A number of different studies, so, have been conducted to relate firm performance measures to corporate governance characteristics for companies at varied industrial sectors and economies (Abidin et Goswami, 2002 ). The conclusions achieved from these studies have also differed considerably.
Generally good and well designed corporate governance policies are advocated for high performance. Emphasis is given on the inclusion of a number of outside directors in the governing body, with a view that their independence from interests attached to the company would lead to better management and performance. In this regard, it is notable that the necessity of good corporate governance practices has recently attracted the attention of wide range of communities, particularly due to the collapse of big reputable firms from mismanagement of resources.
A prominent contemporary example is the enormous financial loss sustained by the Swiss bank UBS as a result of rouge trading and lack of proper supervision (Wright et al., 2011 ; Thomasson and Koltrowitz, 2011) . Similar detrimental impacts on economy from failure of large corporates have also occurred in Australia. In 2001, OneTel, then a major Australian telecommunications company, collapsed due to ambitious undertakings and erroneous decision makings (Legard, 2001 ; Avison and Wilson, 2002) . In the same year, HIH, a major insurer, collapsed due to poor corporate governance and caused a $5.3 billion deficiency in the economy (Lipton, 2003) . Another recent example, also concerning improper corporate governance practices, is the failure of Lehman Brothers (Bris, 2010) . With such history of large corporation failures and the current economic turmoil, adequate corporate governance principles particularly in the area of robust risk management have been prescribed (Kirkpatrick, 2009 ).
Information Technology (IT) is a relatively new industrial sector, comprising of companies primarily dealing with (but not limited to) software development, provision of web services, database management, hardware and communication equipments design and marketing, and information processing. The sector is very dynamic with quickly changing business environment, fast scientific development, rapid variations in consumer demand and high competitions. Effective management and well considered corporate government policies are, hence, very important for survival and operations of the IT companies. Considering the differing characteristics of the IT business sector from other industrial areas, it is of interest to examine how corporate governance characteristics relates specifically to performance of the IT companies, a research area yet to be well explored.
In recent years, Australia has posed itself as a leading entity in the global economy and the IT sector forms an important part of its economic structure. This article reflects on this particular area of Australian economy and empirically relate corporate governance characteristics to firm performance. More specifically, focus is made on the board composition and characteristics of a sample of 55 publicly listed Australian IT companies, and performance in terms of a number of measures is statistically analyzed. Further, a linear regression model for these performance measures, with board characteristics and other company information as the control variables, are developed. The importance of board characteristics on these linear regression models is also examined.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on relevant literature, followed by a summarized overview of the board structure for the Australian publicly listed IT companies in Section 3. Section 4 provides details of the data used in this research, while Section 5 presents statistical analysis and regression model development. Lastly Section 6 concludes the article with summarized discussions and potential future directions.
Related Literature
Corporate governance establishes the legal, cultural and institutional guidelines, allowing the owners and other stakeholders exercising authority over a company's management and thereby creates a system of accountability with a view to interest protection for all the concerned entities (Bowen, 1994; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; John and Senbet, 1998; Pearce and Osmond, 1999; Oxelheim and Randy, 2003) . The key component within this system is a governing board comprising of personnel both internal and external to the company. There is, however, no common structure, and the board composition and governing principles vary considerably among the companies.
There are also noticeable disagreements among the researchers in regards to effective model of corporate governance. For example, the US corporate governance model has been optimistically viewed by a number of scholars (Fischel and Easterbrook, 1991; Romano, 1993; Easterbrook and Fischel, 1996; Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003) , while the same system has been criticized and questioned in other studies (Jensen, 1989 (Jensen, , 1993 . The model employed in other countries have also come under severe scrutinies, and those adopted at one geographical location have been claimed to be ineffective for firms at the other geographical localities (Roe, 1993; Charny, 1998 There have also been studies arguing the influence of board characteristics on firm performance. For instance, Ahmed et al. (2006) note, for a sample of listed New Zealand firms, that earnings informativeness is negatively related to board size and unrelated to the proportion of external directors. Adams and Ferreira (2009) examine the impact of gender diversity in the governing body and find the average effect on firm performance to be negative. Bhagat and Black (2001) challenge the US corporate governance practices of public companies being dominated by the outside directors. The study reveals that firms having higher board independence do not perform better than the other firms. Shujin (Shijun, 2008) reports that firms possessing larger board size have lower variability in performance. Frick and Bermig (2010) analyze the impact of board composition and size on the valuation and performance for 294 German firms and fail to find any effect of these on the performance. Another recent research by Guest (2009) has also observed strong negative influence of board size on performance in terms of profitability, Tobin's Q and share returns. Duchin et al. (2010) The IT industry, however, is very dynamic with rapid scientific development, fast changes in business environment and, particularly in the Australian context, a sector with lack of skilled personnel. With such potential positive influence of the industry on the overall economy and the inherent challenges, it is imperative to conceptualize how the companies within this sector are governed and what impact the governance characteristics have on the performance of these companies. To the best of the investigators' knowledge, this issue is still unexplored in the Australian context. This article aims to bridge this gap through empirical analysis on the publicly listed Australian IT companies in the subsequent discussions.
While the exact nature of business and operational strategies for the publicly listed IT companies in Australia vary considerably, the governing board structure can be generalized as shown in Figure 1 . The board is composed of personnel in three roles: Executive Board Members, Senior Management Members and Non-executive Board Members. Executive members are personnel on the company payroll and are involved in administering the total operations of the company. The role title of executive members varies from company to company, though commonly they are referred to as the Chief Executive Officers (CEO). Senior Management members are also employee of the company, involved in administering day to day activities of the company and also participating in the governing board's activities as defined by the institution's policies. The role title of senior management members also vary from company to company, and are often referred to as the Chief Financial Officer, General Manager, Chief Information Officer and Chief Operating Officer. Non-executive members are directors in the board who do not hold any monetary interest with the company. They are usually personnel with reasonable knowledge of the company's business operation, and bring forth their experiences to influence and monitor the activity of the governing body from an outside perspective. Overall, the executive members and the senior management personnel comprise the internal control, while the non-executive members constitute the external control over the governing body. Datamonitor360 provides financial details on a number of companies located across the world and belonging to the major industry sectors. The source also reflects on governing board structure of the companies, and particularly reflects on the role played by each of the board members. Company360 is based on the commercial database provided by the Dun & Bradstreet (Australia) Pty Ltd, and comprise details and analysis on the leading 50,000 Australian companies. A particular information provide by this database is the (SIC), reflecting principal business of the companies. Also, the source provides information about the number of employees in the companies along with other financial details. Yahoo!7 Finance is an online service delivering up-to-date information on varied financial statistics of Australian companies and stock market status.
In addition to these data sources, information from the Australian Stock Exchange is used to identify the companies belonging to the information technology area and companies for which active trading information are available.
For the 55 companies thus selected, a set of information (as up-to-date on the 17th Nov 2011) reflecting the varied characteristics are collected and processed. The information considered are as shown in Table 2 . General information are collected from Company360, while Corporate governance information are collected from Datamonitor360. The rest of the information are collected from Yahoo!7 Finance. Of these other information, five variables reflect a company's valuation, two the profitability, two the management effectiveness, and the rest varied financial measures. Table 2 also presents explanation on the variables considered. In Table 3 , summary statistics for the different variables are detailed. Figure 2 , further, shows the number of companies grouped by location and primary SIC. For the companies selected, most are located/headquartered in New South Wales, followed by Victoria, Western Australia and Queensland. Only few IT companies are quartered in the other localities. While the activities of all these companies fall within the IT industrial sector, the specific nature of primary business for these companies varies. Of the 55 companies, majority of the companies are engaged principally in delivering computer programming and related services (SIC 7371). A number of companies also design and publish pre-packaged software as their principal business (SIC 7372), while a few focus on the wholesale distribution of computing peripherals, equipment, and software (SIC 5045), and the development of customized integrated systems (SIC 7373). A minor number of companies are also engaged in other industrial sectors with information technology based products and services as their key business. There are also a noticeable number of companies that operate within the information technology contexts elsewhere unclassified (SIC 7379). Thus, the companies chosen for this research pose a wide range of samples with varied business activities and governance by varied state laws within the Australian economy. 
Analysis and Outcomes
This section presents our analytical approach and the outcomes in regards to relating the firm performance with the corporate governance characteristics for the chosen companies. The research framework adopted is shown in Figure 3 . After information has been collected and combined from the data sources indicated in the previous section, the variables are processed for subsequent steps. Statistical analysis is then undertaken based on the governing board characteristics. The final step comprises a linear regression model development to relate firm performance with the board characteristics and other variables. The following subsections focus on each of these steps in details.
Process Information
The information collected is augmented by the introduction of a new variable termed Balance Ratio. Let, BS, EB, and SM indicate the total board size, the number of executive board members and the number of senior management members in the governing body. Then Balance Ratio (BR) is as defined in Eq. 1. In Figure 4 (a), we show the cumulative distribution function for BR. As notable, only few companies have BR ≤0.45, a number of companies have BR within the range of 0. 45 
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We presume that, for 0.00 ≤ BR < 0.45, activities of the governing board are heavily influenced by the external members due to their numbers exceeding that of the internal members (comprising of internal executives and senior management roles). So, we label these companies as EXTERNAL. For 0.45 ≤ BR ≤ 0.55, the governing body comprises about equal number of internal and external members. So, these companies are labelled as BALANCED. All other companies are presumed to be influenced by the internal board members. We consider a further arbitrary threshold 0.7 for these companies. For companies having 0.55 < BR < 0.70, we presume that the governing body is generally impacted by the internal board members with the external members having some considerable influence. These companies are labelled as MODERATELY INTERNAL. On the other hand, for companies having BR ≥ 0.70, the governing body is presumed to be significantly impacted by the internal executive members and senior managements. So, these companies are labelled as HEAVILY INTERNAL. Figure 4 (b) shows the number of companies in each of these groups. As notable, majority of the companies are MODERATELY INTERNAL. A considerable number of companies are HEAVILY INTERNAL. Only few companies are EXTERNAL, while the rest are BALANCED. In other words, for the publicly listed Australian IT companies, the governing bodies are generally influenced by the internal management. This is also indicated in Figure 4 (c) , that indicates the mean and the median of BR to be respectively 0.63 and 0.67. In addition to augmenting the dataset with the introduction of BR, we consider a set of variables as the firmperformance variables (i.e., response variables) for subsequent statistical analysis and model development. The variables are as shown in Table  4 Table 4 also shows these symbols.
Statistical Analysis based on Balance Ratio Group
We consider the grouping based on BR and examine whether any statistically significant difference exists between these groups. As notable in Fig. 4 (b Table 4 ) are considered. We also recognize that the number of available samples is low and a parametric test is not well-suited. So, the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test is utilized to identify statistically significant difference in median among these groups.
In Table 5 , statistical significance for difference in median for the groups based on the two sided non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test is presented. Difference significant at least 90% confidence levels are noted. For measures significant in two sided test, further test is performed to determine the sign. In Table 5 , the '*' sign beside statistically significant outcomes indicates that the median for first group is significantly less than the second group. The numbers in bracket indicate the confidence levels at which the outcomes are significant.
We observe that, in terms of Profit Margin, the median value for the companies in the EXTERNAL and the BALANCED group are significantly lower (at 90% confidence level) than that for the HEAVILY INTERNAL group. In terms of Operating Margin and Return on Assets, the median values for the companies in the EXTERNAL and the BALANCED are also significantly lower than both the MODERATELY INTERNAL and HEAVILY INTERNAL groups, but at a stronger confidence level (95%). No significant difference exists among the internally controlled groups. Thus, for the chosen sample, the internally controlled companies appear to have performed significantly better, in terms of Operating Margin and Return on Assets, than the balanced and the externally controlled companies (having BR ≤ 0.55). In other words, the Australian IT companies having notable influence of external members in the governing body have tended to perform worse than the internally governed counterparts. We presume that this difference comes from the characteristics of IT industry. As indicated previously, the IT industry is a dynamically changing sector, imposing the need of rapid executive decision making to cope with the fast changing market environment. The companies having internal majority in the governing body are well-suited to this sort of sector, and we assume that this has been reflected in the test outcomes.
Linear Regression Model Development
In this section, we focus on relating the chosen performance variables to the control variables through a set of linear regression models. The goal is to examine which performance variables are influenced by any of the board characteristics information along with other information for a linear model assumption. The symbols indicated in the Table 4 are used to refer to these variables in subsequent discussion. The model is developed in two steps.
As indicated in Table 4 In Table 6 , the predictors thus chosen for each of the response variables (and a linear regression model structure) have been shown. As notable, different predictors have appeared in the final model for the different response variables. We particularly focus on the response variables for which the predictor set contains at least one of the board structure information. This is due to our objective of relating firm performance with the corporate governance characteristics. We observe that the response variable RA (Return on Assets) do not consider any of the corporate governance information, while all the other 3 response variables contains at least one of the corporate governance characteristics in the predictor sets. We conclude that, for a linear parametric model assumption and the Australian IT companies, the Return on Assets is negligibly impacted by the firm's board characteristics. We note that the number of senior management members in the governing body (SM), a board characteristic information, has appeared in the predictor set of all the other 3 response variables. This implies, the number of members in such role has a notable impact in characterizing the firm's performance in terms of Profit Margin, Operating Margin and Return on Equity. The number of external members and the Balance Ratio also appear in the predictor sets for Operating Margin and Return on Equity, implying stronger effect of board characteristics on these two performance measures.
In the second step of model development, we determine the parameters of the linear regression models relating each of the response variables with the predictor set determined in the previous step. We consider only the three response variables influenced by board characteristics. Thus, we derive coefficients for the following 3 linear models: 
For each of these models, the parameters are learnt using the Ordinary Least Squares strategy implemented in R (R Development Core Team, 2011). The coefficients determined are respectively as shown in Table 7 Strimmer, 2010, 2011) , decomposes the variance explained by the model into relative contribution for each of the predictors, and also group correlated and downweigh contrasting explanatory variables, resulting in a robust canonical reordering of the predictors. Table 10 reports the relative importance for the predictors for each of the response variables.
We observe that the number of senior management members in the internal governing body has at least 2% importance in characterizing all the three linear models. The model for Profit Margin comprises only this board characteristic variable in its set of predictors and the relative importance of this control variable is 14%. The importance of the other two board characteristics in the other two models, however, are negligible, with Balance Ratio having more influence than the number of non-executive members.
Overall, the outcomes indicate that, for the publicly listed Australian IT companies, the number of members in the senior management role have greater influence on firm performance than the board composition structure. Further, the number of non-executive members has very minor influence. The results are consistent with the analysis outcomes in Section 5.2, and we attribute the characteristics of these outcomes to the dynamic properties of the IT industrial sector.
Conclusion
This article has related the board characteristics of publicly listed Australian IT companies to the firms' performance. Section 2) .The article, further, relates the firm performance measures to the board characteristics (in terms of board composition and Balance Ratio) and other information through a set of linear regression models. As there are a number of predictors, a model selection strategy based on Akaike's Information Criteria has been performed and the performance measures that are parametrically related to the board composition and Balance Ratio have been considered. Based on this, parametric linear model for the Profit Margin, Operating Margin, and Return on Equity have been developed. Relative importances of the predictors in the final models have also been analyzed. The analysis reveals that the number of personnel in Senior Management role is a considerable board characteristic factors in all the regression models. The number of independent members and the Balance Ratio, however, have negligible impact. The other board characteristics like the number of executive board members and the total board-size do not appear as significant predictors in any of the models. The analysis results again highlight the limited impact of board independence on firm performance for the publicly listed Australian companies. We presume that the dynamic nature of IT sector, that requires rapid decision making in a fast changing operational environment and are wellsuited for internally controlled business operations, have caused these outcomes. The results suggest that there exist no convincing evidence of a strong positive and significant relationship between independent directors and corporate performance in IT sector in Australia. Our finding is consistent with a number of other Australia studies such as Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) who argue that more independent board members could perform some functions better but possibly destroy value in many other ways; resulting no net benefit to the company in terms of better monitoring, quick response and/or effective decision making. It could also be argued that fast growing companies in IT may benefit from lower proportion of independent directors but with higher number of senior management and executives who can facilitate quick decision making and provide expert advice in a short period of time. As opposed to this, Bhagat and Black (1998) note that low-growing companies may require high proportion of independent director to control abuses related to free cash flow by executives and to ensure that such funds are reinvested back into the company.
Overall, the article has contributed an understanding of the impact of governing board composition and structure on performance for the publicly listed Australian companies. In a later research, we expect to investigate the negative or limited influence of board independence on performance for companies within this sector in further details.
